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COPYRIGHT LAW, PRIVACY, AND ILLEGAL FILE SHARING:
DEFEATING A DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF PRIVACY
INVASION
Daniel Gomez-Sanchez*
This Comment addresses privacy counterclaims by defendants
engaged in litigation with the Recording Industry Association of
America for copyright infringement.
It is well settled that those mediums that specifically provide
an avenue for the illegal file sharing of music can be held liable for
contributory infringement of copyright, and this Comment provides
an overview of the accepted law. Furthermore, it also well settled
that those persons, who share music over the Internet, are themselves
liable for direct infringement of copyright. This Comment specifi-
cally addresses the latter topic.
The Recording Industry Association of America has brought
claims of copyright infringement against direct infringers. More of-
ten than not, these claims have arisen due to the monitoring of a sus-
pected copyright infringer's computer for "stolen files." The allega-
tions of copyright infringement, and the facts alleged therein, gave
rise to counterclaims of invasion of privacy, trespass to chattels, and
violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. This Comment ex-
plains why such counterclaims ofprivacy invasion will not survive.
After defeating the privacy counterclaims, the Comment ar-
gues that a sound recording copyright is tangible property, which is
central to defeating the privacy counterclaims. It is this last analysis
that stresses the importance of a sound recording copyright and its
application to the current state of the unauthorized downloading of
music.
Lastly, this Comment examines how arms of government are
* B.A., John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 2005; J.D. Candidate, Touro College, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center 2008. Special thanks to Professor Rena Seplowitz for all of her
comments and guidance during the drafting of this Comment.
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attempting to remedy the illegal downloading and uploading of copy-
right and the ensuing copyright infringement and concludes that fur-
ther protections of copyright are necessary to protect all holders of
sound recording copyrights.
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COPYRIGHT LAW, PRIVACY, AND ILLEGAL FILE SHARING:
DEFEATING A DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF PRIVACY
INVASION
INTRODUCTION
The advent of Napster' and its successors brought about a
changed view on copyright infringement, and how copyright law
should be used to restrain it. At its peak, Napster boasted 1.57 mil-
lion simultaneous users.2 The Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") reported an astronomical 2.6 billion songs were
downloaded every month.3 Judicial action was immediately neces-
sary to contain the widespread infringement of copyrights.
Copyright law, standing alone, is an ineffective means of
regulating the uploading and downloading of copyrighted music that
leads to the massive degradation of copyright. The limitations of the
Copyright Act4 are apparent when copyright holders attempt to assert
their paramount rights against direct infringers of copyright. Cur-
rently, the Act does not allow a copyright holder to escape liability
for invasion of privacy when attempting to discover the identity of
direct infringers of copyright prior to discovery in civil litigation.
When it was released in 1999, Napster was the first of many peer-to-peer music sharing
services which made the unauthorized downloading of music a major issue in future copy-
right battles. See CHRISTOPHER MITTEN, SHAWN FANNING: NAPSTER AND THE MUSIC
REVOLUTION (2002) for a historical discussion of Napster and its founder.
2 Report: Napster Users Lose that Sharing Feeling, CNN.COM, June 28, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/06/28/napster.usage/index.html.
3 Statement of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Be-
fore the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, available at
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=EB213DD3-EFEC-E865-7B5A-ADC3408A7004.
4 17 U.S.C.A. § 101-1332 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (providing statutory protection for
copyrights).
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This Comment will focus primarily on how the owners of copyright,
using copyright and property law, can break down the walls of pri-
vacy to discover the thief hiding behind the internet protocol ("IP")
address.
Imagine, as the owner of a record label, that you discovered
music CDs were being shared over the Internet for mass consump-
tion. Users of file sharing software were downloading your unre-
leased and already-released songs by the billion every month. As the
owner, you believe something must be done to combat this mass in-
fringement of your proprietary rights.6 Consequently, on all copies of
your CDs, you install proprietary software that tracks the movements
of those songs if they are placed on a user's computer. Should a song
be uploaded to the Internet, the software would alert the record label
of the user's infringing activity. You also hire a private internet in-
vestigation firm to scour the peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks to dis-
cover any current infringement, and allow the firm to investigate each
infringer's computer to discover whether any of your other copy-
rights have been infringed. Is this an invasion of privacy?
How is this situation different from placing a dog tag on a
domesticated animal to identify ownership, or perhaps using distin-
guishing marks, such as color or shape, to determine ownership?
For example, if a person walked onto another's property, and
An IP address identifies'an individual's computer on the Internet. Each IP address is
unique to that user. DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER AND INTERNET WORDs: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO
HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, AND CYBERSPACE 146 (2001).
6 The record company wants to protect the profitability of an unreleased/released phon-
orecord because the copyright exists not only in the phonorecord but in the sound recording
as well. The interests of the artist are tied together with the interests of the record company
because most record contracts do not allow an artist to collect royalty payments until the re-
cord label has recouped its investment.
[Vol. 24
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stole a chattel from the front yard, then that person is permitted to use
reasonable force to recapture the chattel.' While issues of privacy are
implicated, the recapture of the chattel would be justified.8
Can these two situations be meaningfully distinguished? For
example, in the former situation, is there a reason why a person hired
by the record label to search for copyright infringement could not use
"reasonable force"9 to identify the infringer and recapture the profit-
ability of its stolen chattel?
These measures refer generally to the Sony XCP software that
was installed on music CDs distributed by the music giant.'0 The
software was subsequently found to open a "backdoor" on users'
computers who installed the music CD, and thus left them vulnerable
to internet attacks."' Sony eventually reached a settlement, which in
part, precluded any attempts to use copy control protections for two
years.12 Moreover, should Sony want to collect personal information
on users, it must seek express consent.' 3 Yet, this does not preclude
the employment of an end user license agreement ("EULA"), to
which a user, wishing to install the CD on his or her computer, must
adhere to in order to "rip" the CD. The user either agrees to the
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 100-106,260(1) (1965).
8 See infra Part II.B.
9 Used in this sense, "reasonable force" means the employment of investigatory tactics
meant to track infringers.
10 See John Borland, Who has the Right to Control your PC?, CNETNEWS.COM,
http://news.com.comlWho+has+the+right+to+control+your+PC/2100-1029_3-
5961609.html?tag-nl.
11 Id.
12 Settlement Agreement In re Sony BMG CD Technologies Litig., No. 1:05-cv-09575
(NRB), at 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-
BMG/sony-settlement.pdf.
13 Id. at 27-28.
2008]
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EJLA or listens to the CD through conventional means, such as a car
stereo or home entertainment center.
This Comment examines whether record companies, as hold-
ers of musical copyrights, should be allowed to invade the home of
suspected direct infringers of copyright to discover evidence of such
infringement.
Part I of this Comment analyzes the relevant framework that
caused the furor over the degradation of proprietary rights in copy-
right. 14 From Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 15
to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,16 this Com-
ment discusses the relevant cases and illustrates how in each decision
the copyright owners' rights were affected and ultimately protected
by the imposition of third party liability on contributory infringers. 17
Part II explores the RIAA's claims against direct infringers
and addresses the claims employed by direct infringers citing an in-
vasion of their individual privacy rights.1 8 Specifically, Part II fo-
cuses on the limited privacy rights of direct infringers who have
flouted copyright law. Owners of sound recording copyrights are en-
titled to use "physical force" to protect their property during the their
investigation of purported copyright infringers because sound re-
cording copyrights are much like tangible property. Such measures
allow copyright owners to safeguard the profitability and viability of
their individual copyrights. Furthermore, Part II demonstrates that
14 See infra Part 1.
" 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
16 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
'7 See infra Part I.
18 See infra Part II.
[Vol. 24
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government officials believe amendments to copyright law are
needed to protect copyright holders' rights against the mass facilita-
tion of copyright infringement.1 9
Finally, this Comment concludes that in order for copyrights
to be protected courts should not hold copyright holders liable for
trespass to chattel, invasion of privacy, or violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act.20
I. UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING OF MusIc FACILITATES
COPYRIGHT INFRINGMENT
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
have Power" to award authors and inventors exclusive control over
their works for a limited period of time.21 This power enabled Con-
gress to enact the Copyright Act.22 The Copyright Act defines copy-
right ownership, the duration of a copyright, what actions constitute
copyright infringement, and the remedies for such infringement.
23
Section 106 of the Copyright Act sets forth the exclusive rights held
by copyright owners.24 These provisions offer the basis for actions
'9 See infra Part II.D.
20 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). See infra Part III.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 provides, in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eies ......
22 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1332.
23 See generally id.
24 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2000) states, in pertinent part:
[T]he owner of copyright.., has the exclusive rights to do and to au-
thorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords ....
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
2008]
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against contributory infringers 25 and direct infringers of copyright
through the unauthorized downloading of music.
It is hard to imagine that the unauthorized downloading of
music does not facilitate copyright infringement. With countless
types of file sharing software available for mass consumption,
downloading songs by popular artists with the mere click of a mouse
button has never been easier. 26 Yet, the fight against copyright in-
fringement began as quickly as the file sharing technology became
available.27
In a series of cases, courts interpreted the rights of copyright
holders as paramount to those of third party technology companies
that have sought to exploit or ease the frustrations of a consumer with
regard to the copyright holders' protected intellectual property.28 The
following cases are important because the contributory infringement
holdings not only affected the entertainment industry and its consum-
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing ....
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
25 The Copyright Act does not have an express provision for contributory infringement,
which is derived solely from case law.
26 As of September 2007, there were still several functioning P2P networks available.
Some examples are BitTorrent clients, LimeWire, and GNUnet. In Canada, it is even easier
to download copyrighted music-because it is legal. See John Borland, Judge: File Sharing
Legal in Canada, CNETNEWS.CoM, http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5182641 .html (stat-
ing that a Canadian federal judge found that, under the law, file sharing "appeared to be le-
gal"). See BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] F.C. 488 (Can.), for the complete deci-
sion. The Canadian decision and its impact on file-sharing cases in the United States is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
27 Napster became available in June of 1999. The first lawsuit against Napster began with
the filing of a complaint by the RIAA in December of 1999 in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. Jack McCarthy, Studios Sue MP3 Startup Nap-
ster, CNN.coM, http://archives.cnn.com/1999/TECH/computing/I2/09/napster.suit.idg/.
28 See infra Part I.A-D.
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ers, but also implicitly stated that direct infringement will occur ab-
sent a showing of fair use. 29 Specifically, mass facilitation of copy-
right infringement was at issue in the later cases. 30 Sony was the first
case in which the Supreme Court cogently analyzed the doctrine of
contributory infringement and its application to copyrights. The
same principles were later used in Napster to fend off mass infringe-
ment of copyright. 3'
A. The Sony/Betamax Decision
The Sony decision was the first United States Supreme Court
case to analyze the doctrine of contributory infringement with respect
to new technology and its impact on copyright. 2 The Court based its
decision on the application of copyright law to technology that af-
forded consumers the opportunity to copy television shows directly to
videocassette.33
The issue before the Court was whether the sale of the Be-
tamax 34 recording machine violated any rights conferred by the
Copyright Act on copyright holders of television programming when
users videotaped copyrighted television programs.35 While this issue
29 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 447. See also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that there can be no contributory infringement claim
without a finding that Napster users directly infringed copyright).
30 See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
31 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajfd in
part, rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
32 Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-42.
I d. at 420.
34 The Betamax machine, which was released in 1975, was the precursor to the VCR,
which was released in 1976. See ROBERT V. HUDSON, MASS MEDIA: A CHRONOLOGICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, AND
BOOKS IN THE UNITED STATES 350 (1987).
" Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
2008]
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seemed to be straightforward, Universal's argument that Sony was
engaging in contributory infringement of copyright complicated the
matter.36 The crux of Universal's argument was that because some
individuals used the Betamax machine to record copyrighted televi-
sion shows, Sony was liable in damages for providing the means to
infringe copyright.37 The Court rejected Universal's claim that
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.38 established the grounds for contributory
infringement, and distinguished supplying the means to a consumer
to engage in infringement and actually providing the copyrighted
work.39 Moreover, the Court held a contributory infringer was usu-
ally in a position to control the use of a copyrighted work, whereas
Sony was not.4 °
In borrowing the staple article of commerce doctrine from
patent law, the Court noted that a patent holder could not assert a
claim of contributory infringement if the article of commerce, al-
though utilized for infringing uses, was also exploited for noninfring-
ing, lawful uses. 4 1 Thus, the Court concluded that Sony's sale of the
36 Id. at 434 (stating the Copyright Act does not expressly hold contributory infringers li-
able for copyright infringement).
37 Id. at 420. Universal's allegation becomes relevant in subsequent cases against Napster
and Grokster which will be examined later in this Comment.
38 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
39 The Court held that Kalem did not provide the "means" to hold Sony liable because it
would have been an argument that "rests on a gross generalization .... " See Sony, 464 U.S.
at 436. The Court further stated that, in Kalem, not only did the producer (of an unauthor-
ized film drama based on the copyrighted book Ben-Hur) supply the means for infringement,
he also supplied the work. Id. at 435-36. Moreover, the Court noted that Sony neither had
any direct contact with users of the Betamax machine, n3r those who infringed copyright.
Id. at 437-38.
40 See id. at 437-38. See also id. at 437 n. 18 (citing to several cases where a contributory
infringer was in control of the use of copyrighted works). This aspect of control becomes
relevant in the Napster decision.
41 Id. at 441 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1,48 (1912)).
[Vol. 24
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Betamax could not amount to contributory infringement "if the prod-
uct [was] widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes., 42
The question then became whether Sony's Betamax machine
was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.43 Sony advanced a fair
use defense44 of private, non-commercial time-shifting in the home.45
The time-shifting defense argued that a user of the Betamax machine
should be allowed to record television shows (that were broadcasted
at times when the user was unavailable to watch them) and watch the
shows at a later time when the user became available.46 The Court
recognized time-shifting may enlarge the viewing audience of televi-
sion programs, and that several producers of television shows author-
ized the use of private time-shifting.47 Further, the Court concluded
such authorized time-shifting should not choke the sale of such
equipment because that equipment was used by some to make unau-
thorized copies of copyrighted works.48 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the plaintiffs did not represent all copyright owners, but merely a
small percentage.49
[I]n an action for contributory infringement against
the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects
only his programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all
42 Id. at 442.
43 Id.
44 The fair use defense is codified in 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2000).
45 See generally Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-56. The time-shifting argument gave rise to a
space-shifting argument explored by the MP3.com and Napster decisions. See infra Part IB-
C.
46 Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.
41 Id. at 443.
48 Id. at 446.
49 Id. at 443 (stating the plaintiffs comprised less than ten percent of the market share).
2008]
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copyright holders with an interest in the outcome. °
Next, the Court addressed the unauthorized time-shifting in-
fringement of copyright, the application of the defense of fair use,
and whether it militated against a finding of substantial noninfringing
use. The Court stated that it first had to weigh the factors enumerated
in section 107 of the Copyright Act to determine whether use of a
copyrighted work is a fair use.5 In addressing the first three factors
of section 107, the Court noted the Betamax machine was not being
used for commercial purposes when applied to private use in the
home.52 Moreover, the fact that the television shows were offered in
their entirety for free on their initial broadcast did not prevent a find-
ing of fair use when the entire work was reproduced.
53
In addressing the fourth fair use factor, section 107(4), the
Court considered the effect of the non-commercial use of the copy-
righted material on the marketplace.5 4  To prove that a non-
commercial use is harmful, or would adversely affect the market for a
5o Id. at 446. The Court's argument here would not bar the actions in Napster, MP3.com,
or Grokster, as all the major recording companies were seeking a judgment on the case.
51 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 states, in pertinent part:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work....
52 Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
53 Id.
14 Id. at 451.
[Vol. 24
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copyrighted work, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the
evidence "that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists."55
If the use is for commercial gain, the likelihood of harm is pre-
sumed.56  Citing the district court's findings, the Supreme Court
found there was no actual harm, and the plaintiffs' fears were un-
founded.57
Ultimately, the Court found the Betamax was capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses, therefore Sony was not liable for con-
tributory infringement. 58 Furthermore, the Court specifically noted a
direct infringer could not be liable unless the use of copyrighted ma-
terial violated an exclusive right conferred by the Copyright Act, sub-
ject, of course, to whether the infringement was fair use.59
B. The MP3.com Decision
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. ,60 is the first of sev-
eral cases dealing with the emergence of new technology and how
copyright law, post-Sony, would apply to digital musical copyrights.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Sony, 464 U.S. at 452-53. For example, the district court noted the Nielsen ratings
would not be affected, revenues would not decrease, that there was no factual basis for the
plaintiffs' prediction that live television and movie theater audiences would decrease, and
that there would be a reduction in audiences for re-runs and video rental. Id. at 453 nn.36-
39.
58 Id. at 456. The Sony decision also contributed to the emergence of new legal theories
that became relevant in later decisions when applied to the music industry cases against
MP3.com, Napster, and Grokster. For example, the arguments put forth by the music indus-
try harkened back to the arguments used in the Sony decision, which is why Sony and its le-
gal maxims are so important and relevant today. See EFF.org, The Betamax Case,
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/betamax/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2008), for a comparison of ar-
guments made by Universal's counsel in Sony, and arguments made by MGM's counsel in
Grokster.
" Sony, 464 U.S. at 447.
60 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
2008]
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Although the case involved direct infringement of copyright by a
technology company, the holding emphasizes a theme central to this
discussion: direct infringement will not be tolerated, and those who
directly infringe will be held liable.
This case turned on whether MP3.com, the defendant, could
purchase tens of thousands of music CDs, "rip" them into MP3 files,
place those files onto their servers, and make the music files available
to its customers over the Internet.61 The case presented an interesting
issue because the MP3.com customers could not access the music
files unless they already owned the particular CD they wanted to ac-
cess. 62 This case, however, focused on the direct infringement liabil-
ity of MP3.com rather than the consumer, because MP3.com was it-
self infringing those rights.63
MP3.com argued fair use and, to substantiate its defense, in-
troduced a variant of the time-shifting argument that was presented in
Sony-space-shifting-to substantiate its defense. 64  The space-
shifting argument, as presented, maintained that because the customer
already owned the CD, MP3.com's placement of those MP3 files on
its servers merely eliminated one step that a consumer needed to take
61 Id. at 350. See also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the process of converting CD re-
cordings into MP3 files, as well as defining MP3). Diamond also stands for another very
important proposition: portable MP3 players are not digital audio recording devices within
the meaning of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992. Id. at 1081. Explicit in the Ninth
Circuit's determination is that users may legally transfer MP3 files of music they converted
from their own private collection, thus space-shifting, for non-commercial private use. Id. at
1079.
62 See MP3.com for a discussion of MP3.com's beam-it service. MP3.com, 92. F. Supp.
2d at 350.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 351.
[Vol. 24
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to "carry" his music collection anywhere a computer with internet ac-
cess was available.65 MP3.com asserted that, under factor one of the
fair use test, unauthorized copies were being transmitted in a different
medium, and therefore constituted a transformative fair use.66 How-
ever, the court dismissed this argument as implausible because
MP3.com's inclusion of the plaintiffs' CDs on its servers was not suf-
ficiently transformative, amounting to nothing more than a "re-
playing for [its] subscribers converted versions of the recordings it
copied, without authorization, from the plaintiffs' copyrighted
CDs. ' 6
In discussing the second and third factors, the court deter-
mined that the nature of the copyrighted work was neither factual nor
descriptive, and that MP3.com copied the entirety of the copyrighted
works.68
Regarding the fourth factor, the court found the defendant's
activities impeded the plaintiffs' right to license the copyrighted
works for reproduction.69 While MP3.com argued that the plaintiffs
had not yet entered the new market forged by MP3.com, the court re-
jected this contention because a holder of a copyright's exclusive
rights flowed from the Constitution and the Copyright Act, and there-
fore, a copyright holder had the sole right to enter a chosen "new"
market.7° Moreover, the plaintiffs introduced licensing agreements as
65 Id. at 350.
66 Id. at 351.
67 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
68 Id. at 351-52.
69 Id. at 352. See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1).
70 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
20081
15
Gomez-Sanchez: Copyright Law, Privacy, and Illegal File Sharing: Defeating a Def
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
evidence of an entry into the new market forged by MP3.com. 71
Furthermore, the MP3.com court rejected the argument that
consumer demand for a new market dictates when infringement of
copyright is permissible, 72 reasoning that such a claim was inequita-
ble.73 Thus, a consumer with access to file-sharing software, who
misappropriates the property of a copyright holder, could be held li-
able for infringement regardless of whether consumer demand for
such software was present. At first blush, the MP3.com decision
seems inconsistent with the Sony decision. However, the MP3.com
decision dealt with a mass infringement of tens of thousands of music
CDs, and a claim by all the major record companies, while Sony in-
volved fewer instances of infringement, with less than ten percent of
the television copyright holders bringing suit. The inconsistency can
best be described as a matter of degree.
As a whole, MP3.com supports the view that with each deci-
sion on musical copyright infringement, courts are further eroding the
barrier of privacy with respect to locating direct infringers of copy-
right. Such a breakdown would help identify those infringing uses of
copyright, and allow for better protection of authors' rights. The
Napster74 decision is no different.
C. The Napster Decision
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Napster is most analogous to
71 Id. This is further evidenced by current formats, such as Real Rhapsody and Yahoo
Music Unlimited, to which record labels have licensed copyrighted works.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
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Sony. Napster, which introduced a new breed of copyright infringe-
ment, involved a novel technology, called P2P file sharing, that fa-
cilitated copyright infringement on a colossal scale.75 Yet, Napster
was not a true P2P network because it relied on its network servers to
store the vast amounts of copyrighted works traded by its users.76
Regardless, users were able to download their favorite MP3 song
files at a rate of 2.6 billion songs per month.77 If the average album
contained ten songs, Napster users were downloading the equivalent
of 260 million albums per month.
Record companies filed an action against Napster for facilitat-
ing copyright infringement.78 Napster operated a system that permit-
ted "the transmission and retention of sound recordings employing
digital technology. '79 The plaintiffs claimed Napster users engaged
in the "reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works" in viola-
tion of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders by section
106 of the Copyright Act.8° The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that downloading and
uploading copyrighted works by Napster users constituted direct in-
fringement of copyright.
8
'
75 For an explanation of P2P file sharing see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW MEDIA 367-368
(2003).
76 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
77 Statement of Mitch Bainwol, supra note 3.
78 A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900 ("On December 6, 1999, A & M Records
and seventeen other record companies ('record company plaintiffs') filed a complaint ...
against Napster, Inc .... ").
79 Napster,239F.3dat 1011.
'0 17 U.S.C.A. § 106; Id. at 1013.
81 Id. at 1014 (explaining Napster users who uploaded copyrighted song files violated the
plaintiffs' distribution rights under section 106(3) of the Copyright Act, and Napster users
who downloaded copyrighted song files violated plaintiffs' reproduction rights under sec-
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Napster argued that its users were engaged in fair use, and
therefore could not be held to directly infringe the copyrights of the
plaintiffs. 82 The three fair use defenses advanced by Napster were:
(1) sampling, (2) space-shifting, and (3) permissive distribution by
recording artists.83 The sampling defense contended users were mak-
ing temporary copies of the copyrighted songs to determine whether
to purchase the work.8 4 The plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin the per-
missive distribution by recording artists because it was inherently
noninfringing.85
In examining Napster's first defense, that Napster users were
engaged in fair use, the court examined the factors enumerated in sec-
tion 107.86 The court found Napster users were engaged in commer-
cial use of the copyrighted works,87 and that such downloading nega-
tively affected the music industry.88
The court rejected the sampling defense, noting that sampling
plaintiffs' copyrighted works would deprive them of collecting royal-
ties on authorized song samples.89 Moreover, unlicensed sampling
would deprive the copyright holder of the right to license its copy-
tion 106(1) of the Copyright Act).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Napster, 239 F.3dat 1014.
85 Id. at 1019.
86 Id. at 1014-17. See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
87 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015 (stating repeated copying of copyrighted works is the equiva-
lent of commercial use).
88 Id. at 1016-17 (stating the effect of Napster users' constant downloading impedes the
ability of record companies to sell their product, and deprives the copyright owner of the
right to enter a new market).
89 Id. at 1018. See also BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the sampling defense).
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rights for authorized sampling. 90
Finally, the court rejected the space-shifting defense. The
court held that the shifting methods in Diamond9' and Sony "did not
also simultaneously involve [the] distribution of the copyrighted ma-
terial to the general public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted
material exposed the material only to the original user., 92 Moreover,
in Sony, there were only some instances of copyright infringement by
users of the Betamax, 93 compared to the infringement of billions of
copyrighted works in Napster.94
Significantly, the Napster court held that users of software,
such as Napster, may be held liable for direct infringement of copy-
right.95 While this is not surprising, it foreshadowed the impending
litigation against music file sharers. 96  Though proving direct in-
fringement by users is necessary to making out a prima facie case of
contributory infringement, it was not until 2003, two years after the
Napster decision, that the RIAA began instituting actions against un-
authorized filesharers. 97 According to one source, the RIAA's move
to sue individual file sharers came as a result of two separate deci-
90 Napster, 239 F.3dat 1018.
91 Diamond involved the question of whether the use of an MP3 player, such as Apple's
iPod, was a proper exercise of fair use when users space-shifted their music collections onto
the player. See Diamond, 180 F.3d 1072.
92 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
9' Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
94 See Statement of Mitch Bainwol, supra note 3.
95 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (indicating Napster users likely do not have a fair use
defense). This holding was later used by the RIAA to institute actions against individual
persons for unauthorized downloading of music. See infra Part II.
96 See infra Part II.
97 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: Two YEARS LATER 2
(2005) (stating that 261 file sharers were sued on September 8, 2003), available at
www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAAatTWOFINAL.pdf.
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sions: the Central District of California's Grokster decision,9 and
the District of Columbia's order99 compelling Verizon, as an Internet
Service Provider ("ISP"), to provide the RIAA with account informa-
tion regarding its subscribers. 00 The move to sue direct infringers
could hardly be questioned as the RIAA, in the course of a few
months, received its worst and best decision-a decision shielding
Grokster from infringement liability, and a decision allowing the
RIAA to subpoena the names of individual infringers from ISPs
breaking down one wall of privacy. 101
D. The Grokster Decision
In Grokster, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
following question: "[U]nder what circumstances [is] the distributor
of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use ... liable for
acts of copyright infringement by third parties using [its] prod-
uct[?]"' 2 The critical distinction between the Napster software and
the Grokster software was that Grokster did not employ servers to in-
tercept inquiries by users of the content available on the Grokster
98 Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.
2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
99 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., No. 03-7015,
03-7053, 2003 WL 21384617, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 4, 2003), rev'd, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
100 Lisa M. Bowman, Labels Aim Big Guns at Small File Swappers, CNETNEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/Labels+aim+big+guns+at+small+file+swappers/2100-1027-3-
1020876.html (stating the decision in Grokster prompted the RIAA to begin suing individu-
als).
101 See RIAA v. THE PEOPLE, supra note 97, at 3-4. While the Verizon decision was sub-
sequently overturned in Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services,
Inc., it should not bar the RIAA from locating individual infringers. Recording Indus. Ass'n
of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See
infra Part II.
102 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 918-19.
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network. 10 3 Napster, on the other hand, used central servers to inter-
cept users' queries and even temporarily stored transferred files on its
servers.10 4 The distinction was important to the district court and the
court of appeals in Grokster, because the lack of a central server did
not impute actual knowledge of specific infringing activity."0 5 Yet,
the Supreme Court rejected this broad interpretation of the Sony deci-
sion because it declined to take into account certain evidence of in-
ducement to infringe presented by MGM.10 6 The Court stated that
Sony "was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability de-
rived from the common law."'
0 7
Just as the Sony Court borrowed the staple article of com-
merce doctrine from patent law, the Grokster Court borrowed the in-
ducement rule from patent law. 10 8 In doing so, the Grokster Court
held, "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other af-
firmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties."' 0 9 The Court then stated that
neither mere knowledge of the product's infringement potential, nor
actual infringement by users, would be sufficient to impose liability
on the distributor of such technology. 10 There must be "purposeful,
103 Id. at 921-22.
'04 Napster, 239 F.3dat 1012.
10' Grokster, 545 U.S. at 927-28, 933-34.
106 Id. at 933-34.
107 Id. at 934-35.
108 Id. at 936.
109 Id. at 936-37.
no Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.
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culpable expression and conduct .... ',"
Ultimately, the Court found sufficient evidence of induce-
ment.l12 The evidence demonstrated Grokster had communicated di-
rectly with Napster users concerning the ability to download copy-
righted music. 13 Internal documents showed the other defendant,
Streamcast, hoped to attract Napster users once Napster was shut
down. 114 Advertisements touted the defendants as the successors to
Napster. 15 Furthermore, there was no evidence the defendants at-
tempted to filter the copyrighted works.16
Moreover, the Court noted the inducement theory required
evidence that users were directly infringing copyright. Unlike Sony,
the Grokster Court observed that billions of song files were being
shared every month over the defendants' networks, and ninety per-
cent of the files available on the networks were copyrighted works."17
In reversing the summary judgment decision in favor of the defen-
dants, the Court ruled theories of secondary liability must be utilized
because it may be impossible to enforce rights in copyrighted works
against direct infringement. 18 One could surmise that theories of
secondary liability assist copyright holders by halting the infringe-
ment at its source, thereby preventing users from directly infringing
in mass numbers. Moreover, theories of secondary liability allow
Id.
112 Id. at 937-38.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 939.
"' Grokster, 545 U.S. at 924-25.
116 Id. at939.
117 Id. at 922-23. In Sony, there were only a few instances of direct infringement by users.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
18 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-30.
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copyright holders to receive substantial damage awards from con-
tributory infringing companies, whereas collecting from a direct in-
fringing consumer would not provide revenue to adequately recover
the profitability of its infringed copyrights.
The implicit conclusion by various courts, that the facilitation
of copyright infringement by new technologies was degrading the en-
forcement of copyright law, has created a legal framework in which
to begin breaking down the walls of privacy. Courts are now holding
unauthorized music sharers liable for their individual acts of in-
fringement without regard to privacy concerns. As long as individual
file sharers continue to flout copyright law, the laws of privacy
should not offer a shell of protection.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
DOWNLOADING OF MUSIC AND ITS APPLICATION TO
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
In response to Grokster, on September 27, 2006, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff record companies, effec-
tively putting an end to the Grokster issue."19 Yet, at the time of the
decision, the case against direct infringers had been raging for more
than three years.1 2
0
The RIAA began its investigation by gathering evidence using
the same software as P2P users, and retrieving the IP addresses of
119 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d
966 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
120 See RIAA v. THE PEOPLE: Two YEARS LATER, supra note 97, at 2.
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those infringers.12 1 In order to retrieve the names and addresses of
the infringers, the RIAA issued subpoenas against the users' ISPs un-
der section 512(h) of the Copyright Act. 122 Pursuant to the the sub-
poena power of section 512(h), the RIAA attorneys were able to dis-
cover the identities of infringers with a mere allegation of
infringement.1 23 Verizon, however, refused to comply with a sub-
poena from the RIAA issued under section 512(h).1 24 The RIAA sub-
sequently brought an action to compel Verizon to comply.1 25 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected
Verizon's contentions, and ordered it to comply with the subpoena to
reveal the identities of its infringing users. 126 An order staying the
decision while pending appeal was issued and subsequently va-
cated. 127 The decision to vacate the stay authorized the RIAA to con-
tinue its onslaught against direct infringers.
On September 8, 2003, the RIAA announced its first lawsuits
against direct infringers. 128 By the time the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit heard Verizon's appeal, the RIAA had issued
more than 3,000 subpoenas. 129  The appellate court rejected the
121 See Bowman, supra note 100 (stating RIAA investigators will scan the public directo-
ries of popular P2P software).
122 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(h)(1) (West 2000) states, in pertinent part: "A copyright owner...
may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a service pro-
vider for identification of an alleged infringer .. "
123 RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: Two YEARS LATER, supra note 97, at 3.
124 id.
125 See In re Verizon Intemet Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
126 Id. at 44-45.
127 Verizon, 2003 WL 21384617, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 4, 2003).
128 Press Release, RIAA.com, Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who
Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=EB213DD3-EFEC-E865-7B5A-ADC3408A7004.
129 RIAA v. THE PEOPLE: Two YEARS LATER, supra note 97, at 5.
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RIAA's power to subpoena at will, and held that under section 512(h)
the power to issue subpoenas was available only where the infringing
files were located on an ISP's own computer system. 130 Therefore, to
continue gathering identities, the RIAA would have to file a lawsuit,
and seek the names and addresses of infringers through discovery,
under the supervision of a court.'
31
The Court of Appeals decision, however, did not deter the fil-
ing of lawsuits. By 2005, the RIAA had sued over 15,000 infring-
ers.132 The RIAA's lawsuits are the focus of the following sections of
this Comment.
A. The RIAA's Claims Against Direct Infringers
Collectively, the RIAA and individual record companies have
filed suit against over 15,000 individuals. 3 3 The complaints largely
state one claim: copyright infringement. 34 The infringement com-
plaints focus on violations of the exclusive rights to reproduce and
distribute under section 106 of the Copyright Act.1
35
To present a prima facie case of direct copyright infringe-
ment, a plaintiff must show ownership of the copyrighted music and
demonstrate a violation of at least one of the enumerated exclusive
130 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d. 1229,
1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
131 RIAA v. THE PEOPLE: Two YEARS LATER, supra note 97, at 5.
132 Id. at 2.
133 Id.
134 Complaint at 3-5, Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Huggins, No. 05 Civ. 1534 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2005), available at http://codewarriorz.clawz.com/atlantic-huggins-complaint.pdf.
See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2000) (providing that anyone who violates an exclusive
right of a copyright holder may be liable for copyright infringement).
135 See, e.g., Atlantic, No. 05 Civ. 1534 at 4.
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rights in section 106 of the Copyright Act. 136 Proving ownership of
the allegedly infringed copyrights is not difficult because most record
companies file copyright registrations with the Copyright Office pur-
suant to section 408 of the Copyright Act, 137 prior to publication or
shortly thereafter. However, it is more difficult to show that one of
the exclusive rights was violated. Foster, a defendant in a copyright
infringement action, stated in her answer that the claim was com-
menced without her having any actual knowledge or information that
she participated in such illegal activities. 38  Subsequently, Foster
demanded that the plaintiffs provide the dates of the alleged
downloading and the files involved. 139 The plaintiffs, unable to meet
the demand, filed a motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. 140
While the RIAA did not contest the demand in this case, it did chal-
lenge the demand for such specificity in Goldshteyn.14 1
Goldshteyn claimed that the plaintiffs failed to meet the speci-
ficity standards espoused under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 42 because the plaintiffs failed to allege the individual
136 See Napster,239 F.3d at 1013. See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
... 17 U.S.C.A. § 408 (West 2000).
138 See answer filed in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster,
Case No. 04-1569-W, at 9 (W.D. Okla. 2006), available at
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=capitol-fosteramendanscounterclaims.
139 Eric Bangeman, RIAA Loses in File Sharing Case, ARSTECHNICA.COM,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060713-7257.html.
140 Dismissal at 1, Capitol Reocrds, Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W (W.D. Okla. July
13, 2006), available at
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=capitol-fosterdismissal. See also
Bangeman, supra note 139.
141 Maverick Recording Co. v. Goldshteyn, No. CV-05-4523 (DGT), 2006 WL 2166870
(E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2006).
142 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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instances or exact times of infringement.143 However, the court noted
that plaintiffs need not provide the specific instances of infringement
to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.' 44 From the brief opinion, an inference
may be made that the court believed such specifics would be better
dealt with through discovery.
Though the court upheld the sufficiency of the pleadings,145
the ruling begs the question: How will the plaintiff prove specific in-
stances of direct infringement if a trial ensued? Of course, during
discovery a subpoena to the defendant's ISP will be issued and the
specific instances of infringement may be discovered. 46 More than
likely, however, the RIAA or the constituent record companies have
hired outside help to scour the P2P networks. Alternatively, perhaps
the RIAA or the record companies that make up the conglomerate
will hire private investigators to search out infringing users' IP ad-
dresses and monitor their activity. It is this last activity that alleged
copyright infringers have objected to in their answers to the com-
plaint. Part II.B examines each counterclaim.
143 See Goldshteyn, 2006 WL 2166870, at *2.
144 See id. at *3 (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 280,
284 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
141 See Goldshteyn, 2006 WL 2166870, at *5.
146 However, ISPs do not maintain such specific records of a user's activity. This fact is
most evidenced by former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales' efforts to require ISPs to
keep track of customers' online activity. See Declan McCullagh, Gonzales: ISPs Must Keep
Records on Users, Sept. 20, 2006, CNETNEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/Gonzales+ISPs+must+keep+records+on+users/2100-1028_3-
6117455.html (last modified Sept. 20, 2006). This issue will be addressed infra Part II.D.
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B. Assertion of Privacy Rights Are Not a Viable
Counterclaim for Active Copyright Infringers
The Fourth Amendment 147 only protects individuals from
state or federal action. 48 Consequently, states are left to regulate pri-
vacy concerns within the home arising from invasions from private
actors. 149  There have been three counterclaims that defendants in
copyright infringement actions have routinely set forth in their an-
swers to complaints filed by record companies. Those claims are
common law trespass to chattels, common law invasion of privacy,
and an invocation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
50
1. Common Law Trespass to Chattels
A private party may be liable for intentional trespass to chat-
tels by either dispossessing another of the chattel, using the chattel, or
interfering with the chattel that was in possession of another.' 5'
Moreover, if the chattel's quality or value is impaired, or the posses-
sor was deprived of use of the chattel for a substantial time, then the
W4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ...."
148 See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (holding a Fourth Amend-
ment claim cannot exist where there is no governmental action).
149 For example, states have burglary, robbery, and trespass statutes at their disposal.
There are also common law trespass and trespass to chattels remedies. However, defendants
have the ability to invoke the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West
2000).
15o See Answer at 6-8, Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Andersen. Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
Andersen, No. CV 05-933 AS, at 6-8 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2005), available at
http://info.riaalawsuits.us/atlantic-andersen/answer.cc.final.actual.pdf [hereinafter "Ander-
sen Answer"]. Because there are various distinctions among the several States regarding
application of these principles, the Restatement of Torts will serve as a proper guide.
'51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (2007).
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss1/6
PRIVACYAND ILLEGAL FILE SHARING
trespasser may be liable. 152 Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc.153 involved an action for electronic trespass to chattels. The
plaintiff, Compuserve, filed the action against Cyber Promotions be-
cause the defendant sent bulk, unsolicited email advertisements to
Compuserve's customers. 54 The court recognized that the Restate-
ment Second of Torts defined "intermeddling" as intentional physical
contact with a chattel.1 55 Yet, the physical contact must produce
some type of harm to the property, or a loss of value, to put forth a
prima facie case; actual damage must be shown. 156 In issuing an in-
junction against Cyber Promotions, the court noted that Compuserve
was unduly burdened by the bulk mailings because its computer sys-
tems were forced to store mass undeliverable emails, and such storing
drained the processing power of Compuserve's computers. 157
As Compuserve illustrates, a claim of trespass to chattels must
allege actual damage in order to present a prima facie case. Tanya
Andersen's answer contained a counterclaim for trespass to chat-
tels. 58 She alleged the record label employed a company called Me-
diaSentry to "break into [her] personal computer.., to secretly spy..
• and steal information or remove files."' 159 However, the answer al-
leged no actual damage to the chattel-her computer. 60 Therefore,
such a claim by a direct infringer of copyright must fail.
152 See id. at § 218.
153 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
114 Id. at 1017.
"' Id. at 1021 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. e).
156 Id. at 1022-23. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217.
157 Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
158 Andersen Answer, supra note 150, at 6.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 6-7.
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Furthermore, much like a possessor of a chattel has a right to
use reasonable force to protect the chattel, 61 a copyright holder
should have the right to use reasonable force to protect the profitabil-
ity and exclusive rights of its musical copyright by invading a copy-
right infringer's home computer. The Restatement Second of Torts
supoorts this proposition. 162 Section 260, subsection two of the Re-
statement states that one may commit an act which could be deemed
trespass to chattels, but would not incur liability so long as the actor
reasonably believes that the action is necessary to protect his chat-
tels. 163
Therefore, trespass to chattels is a question of which party has
the greater right-the party asserting trespass to her personal com-
puter, or the party asserting an infringement of copyright and engag-
ing in trespass to chattel to protect the viability of its copyright? The
answer should depend on whether a copyright can be treated as a
chattel. 164  Yet, without a claim of actual damage to her personal
computer, Tanya Andersen, or any other defendant claiming trespass
to chattels, would not have a prima facie case.
165
2. Common Law Invasion of Privacy
A private party who intentionally intrudes upon the seclusion
of another's private affairs in a manner that is highly offensive to a
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e.
162 Id. at § 260(1).
163 Id. To sufficiently express the point that copyrighted materials are chattels, we must
assume copyrights are much like tangible property. See infra Part II.C.
164 See infra Part II.C.
165 However, should the defense claim actual damages, its viability depends on whether a
copyright can be construed as physical property. See infra Part II.C.
[Vol. 24
30
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss1/6
PRIVACY AND ILLEGAL FILE SHARING
reasonable person may incur liability for invasion of privacy. 166 Un-
der Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading re-
quires a short and plain statement of the claim. 167 The Andersen An-
swer would seem to meet the pleading requirements.1 68 However, the
Restatement explains under comment d to section 652B that the inter-
ference must be substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son. The comment begs the question: would an invasion by a private
party to investigate the infringement of its copyright be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person who has infringed such copyright?
Surely, any law abiding citizen would answer in the negative.
For example, in Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc.,6 9 the
plaintiff instituted an invasion of privacy action against the defendant
ISC Financial House for harassing phone calls to the plaintiff, plain-
tiffs apartment manager, and plaintiffs former employer, and for in-
quiries to the plaintiffs neighbors about the type of furniture located
within the plaintiffs home. 170 The defendant made phone calls and
inquiries because the plaintiff defaulted on payments to ISC Financial
House. 17 1 The court noted that a creditor has a right to take reason-
able action to pursue a debtor, although it may result in an invasion of
privacy. 172 In concluding that the invasion of privacy claim must fail
because the conduct exhibited by the defendant was not highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person, the court noted the defendant had a le-
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
167 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
168 See Andersen Answer, supra note 150, at 8.
169 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978).
70 Id. at 1337-38.
"'1 Id. at 1337.
172 Id. at 1339-40.
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gitimate debt, and the plaintiff was merely trying to interfere with the
defendant's collection of the debt.17 3  Thus, under Munley, an inva-
sion of privacy claim will fail if a plaintiff committed a wrong against
the defendant because the defendant's conduct would not be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. The defendant would merely be at-
tempting to correct that wrong.
The rule is analogous to section 9-609 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC"). 17 4 Under section 9-609 a creditor may repos-
sess collateral in the possession of a debtor without constituting a
breach of privacy, so long as a breach of the peace does not occur. 75
In Thompson v. First State Bank of Fertile,176 the court held that it
was reasonably necessary for the "repo-man" to enter Thompson's
property to take possession of the automobile because Thompson had
defaulted on his loan.177 The court applied Minnesota's version of
section 9-609 of the U.C.C.17 1
Recognizing that section 9-609 of the U.C.C. applies solely to
secured transactions, it can be said that both creditors and copyright
holders are protecting their economic interests. Therefore, much like
a creditor, a copyright holder who has been victimized by the unau-
thorized uploading and downloading of its copyrights by a direct in-
171 Id. at 1340.
174 U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000) states, in pertinent part: "After default, a secured party... may
take possession of the collateral ... without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of
the peace." From a cursory inspection of cases involving section 9-609, it appears the sec-
tion has not been applied to cases outside the realm of secured transactions. Such novel uses
of existing law however, should not prevent another wholly separate body of law from
adopting its principles. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. 913; Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
175 U.C.C. § 9-609(a)-(b).
176 709 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006).
178 Id. at 313.171 See id. at 3 10-11. See also MINN. STAy. ANN. § 336.9-609 (West 2006).
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fringer may attempt to correct that wrong by gathering evidence
against the direct infringer to commence a lawsuit. Should a direct
infringer, like Andersen, claim an invasion of privacy, the claim
would fail because the record company's conduct of investigating a
home computer would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
since the direct infringer was in possession of the record label's per-
sonal property, or rather, in possession of its economic interests. 1
79
3. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") 180 guards
against the unauthorized intrusion into a protected computer with the
intention to steal government secrets, defraud individuals, and know-
ingly transmit malicious coding software which causes damage.'
81
The CFAA defines "protected computer" as any computer used in in-
terstate communication.' 82 Consequently, a home computer is a "pro-
tected computer" within the meaning of the CFAA. The CFAA ap-
pears to be the federal corollary to the common law action of trespass
to chattels.183 Both the Restatement and the CFAA require a showing
of damage to the chattel-the computer. 184 Therefore, an analysis of
a claim under the CFAA would be akin to a claim for trespass to
chattels.
179 See Munley for the analogous argument. 584 P.2d at 1340. "[ISC Financial House]
had a legitimate debt owed to it by [Munley] and her former husband and [Munley] was in
possession of personal property securing the debt." Id. Again, this analogy depends on
whether a copyright can be construed as tangible property. See infra Part II.C.
180 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030.
" See id. § 1030(a)(1)-(5).
182 Id. at § 1030(e)(2)(B).
183 Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217.
114 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217.
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However, the CFAA also contains a provision prohibiting in-
tentional unauthorized access to obtain information. 85 The mounting
of a defense against a violation of the CFAA hinges on the definition
of "information." Yet, the CFAA failed to define "information."'
' 86
Furthermore, the legislative record is devoid of any indication as to
the definition of "information.' ' 87 Perhaps the drafters thought "in-
formation" was to be construed according to its usual definition:
"The act of informing or the condition of being informed; communi-
cation of knowledge."'
' 88
The Andersen Answer included a counterclaim for a violation
of the CFAA in that private information of the music files contained
within Andersen's home computer was gathered.189 Construing in-
formation according to the usual definition raises the question of
whether the CFAA intended "information" to mean proprietary in-
formation. If so, it would be difficult for Andersen to win on her
CFAA claim.' 90 The copyrighted music contained on Andersen's
computer is the copyright holder's property, unless Andersen herself
purchased the music.' 9' As the rightful proprietary owners of the
copyrighted music, the record companies would have a right to enter
another's property by virtue of the common law defense to trespass to
181 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
186 See id. at § 1030(e).
187 See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-1159 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710 (1984).
188 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 660 (2d College ed. 1985).
189 Andersen Answer, supra note 150, at 7.
190 Section 1030 reveals that the various provisions deal with proprietary information. For
example, the provisions deal with bank account fraud, or the use of proprietary information
to extort. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030.
191 The Andersen Answer fails to claim that the music contained within her home was
purchased. See Andersen Answer, supra note 150, at 7.
106 [Vol. 24
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chattels. 192 Consequently, the CFAA claim must fail if the informa-
tion gathered by MediaSentry's inspection of Andersen's home com-
puter was not Andersen's property in the first place.1
93
A record company would withstand an allegation of the above
three claims if a copyright can be construed as tangible property. The
following section addresses that point.
C. Musical Recording Copyrights are Much Like
Tangible Property
The preceding Section discussed how a record company may
defeat counterclaims of trespass to chattels, invasion of privacy, and a
violation of the CFAA. However, the record companies' defense de-
pends largely on construction of a copyright as tangible property. For
a record company to assert a right to invade a direct infringer's home
computer, it must allege that its sound recording copyrights have
been infringed by direct infringers.
A copyright holder of a sound recording enjoys all the exclu-
sive rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C.A. section 106, except where lim-
ited under section 1 14(a)-(b).194 Section 101 of the Copyright Act de-
192 See Part II.B. 1 for a general discussion of the common law defense to trespass to chat-
tels which gives the right to enter another's property to regain control of illegally obtained
property.
193 An exhaustive review of cases having dealt with any claim arising under the CFAA
claim revealed that no court has dealt with whether "information" means proprietary infor-
mation. This review involved searching "section 1030" on LexisNexis and Westlaw and ex-
amining every case that the search revealed.
194 Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 with 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(a)-(b) (West 2000). Section
114(a) states: "The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are lim-
ited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not include
any right of performance under section 106(4)." Section 114(b) states, in pertinent part:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or
20081
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fines sound recordings as "works that result from the fixation of a se-
ries of musical, spoken, or other sounds .... A sound recording is
different from a phonorecord because a phonorecord is the material
object that contains the music, such as a CD. 19 6 A record company
claiming infringement of copyright could not claim that its phonore-
cord copyright has been infringed because direct infringers utilizing
P2P software have reduced the phonorecord to an MP3 file. The file
itself contains the actual sounds that make up a song.
Because the MP3 file contains the musical sounds that make
up a work, an MP3 file can be treated as tangible property. While
this is not the precise holding of Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films,'97 the case did conclude that sound recordings were like physi-
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The
exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are
rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The
exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.
17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b).
195 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2000) states in pertinent part:
"Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompa-
nying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the na-
ture of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords,
in which they are embodied.
196 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 states in pertinent part:
"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'phonorecords'
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
197 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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cal property. 198
Bridgeport Music involved the digital sampling of a two-
second piece of the plaintiffs song.' 99 The specific piece taken was
part of a guitar solo in the original work.200 The defendant did not
deny copying the altered version of the two-second piece and insert-
ing it into his own work.20 1 The appellate court reversed and distin-
guished the analysis for an infringement of a musical composition
copyright from that of sound recording infringement. Therefore the
district court erred in applying a de minimis inquiry.20 2
In rejecting the de minimis or substantial similarity test, the
court noted section 114(b) of the Copyright Act gave "sound re-
cording copyright holders the exclusive right 'to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords .... This meant that per-
sons may imitate the sound recording, but, by no means may some-
one copy the sound recording itself.204 When a direct infringer
downloads or uploads a song to or from a P2P network, the direct in-
fringer is essentially copying the sound recording itself. The CD or
its packaging are not copied, but the sound recording embodied
within the CD is copied. "For the sound recording copyright holder,
it is not the 'song' [itself,] but the sounds that are fixed in the me-
dium of his choice. When those sounds are ... taken directly from
' See id. at 802 (holding sounds sampled directly from a fixed medium constitute a
physical taking, as opposed to an intellectual taking).
... Id. at 796.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 798.
203 Id. at 800.
204 id.
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that fixed medium .... [i]t is a physical taking rather than an intellec-
tual one. 20 5 Consequently, the court adopted a strict sound recording
copyright rule that even if a two-second sample was taken from a
song, it is a physical taking of something with value, and any violator
would be held liable for infringement.20 6
The Bridgeport Music court was correct in its characterization
that copying a sound recording copyright is a "physical taking" be-
cause sound recordings can only be removed directly from the physi-
cal medium in which they are embodied, such as a CD. Such takings
are physical in the sense that the phonorecord is a tangible object.
Once a sound recording is removed from its tangible medium, every
subsequent transmission can be described as having its origin in a
physical taking. It follows that downloaders and uploaders of digital
music are transmitting digital files that have their origin in a tangible
medium, with every succeeding transmission being a vicarious physi-
cal taking. Thus, each taking of a digital sound recording may be
analogized with the first physical-taking of a tangible medium.
Consequently, because sound recording copyrights may be
considered tangible property, viable defenses for record companies
against claims of trespass to chattels, invasion of privacy, and viola-
tions of the CFAA become readily apparent.20 7 Construing a musical
205 Id. at 802.
206 Id. at 801-02.
207 But see Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). The Dowling case dealt with
the application of the National Stolen Property Act to bootleg phonorecords. Id. at 208. The
Supreme Court had to determine whether the bootleg phonorecords were stolen, converted,
or taken by fraud within the meaning of the statute, "only in the sense that they were manu-
factured and distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of the musical composi-
tions performed on the records." Id. at 208, 215-16. The Court also had to determine
whether the bootleg phonorecords were "goods" or "wares" within the meaning the statute.
[Vol. 24
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copyright as tangible property, capable of being possessed, it follows
that a copyright would therefore be capable of being physically pro-
tected as well.20 8
D. Further Showings of a Derogation of Privacy
Rights
As discussed earlier, the effect of mass unauthorized
downloading of copyrighted music has led to lawsuits against direct
infringers. The direct infringers, in turn, filed invasion of privacy
type claims. However, the government is not siding with the infring-
ers.
In 2002, Howard Berman, a representative of California in the
House of Representatives, introduced the Privacy Prevention Bill
("The Bill") to allow a copyright holder to electronically enter a di-
rect infringer's computer. 20 9 The Bill essentially stated that a copy-
right holder would not be liable as a matter of law for interfering with
the rights of direct infringers, so long as no damage was done to any
data contained on the infringer's computer.2l0  The Bill was not en-
Id. at 216. The Court, in rejecting the application of the statute to copyrights, stated that
copyrights were not ordinary chattels because an infringer cannot assume physical control
over a copyright, nor deprive its owner of its use. Id. at 216-17. Therefore, the Court noted
that copyrights cannot be possessed like ordinary goods. Id. at 217. Yet, this holding is out-
dated. The case took place in 1985, before Napster and the mass infringement of copyright
that followed. Most notably, however, the case dealt with a musical composition copyright,
not a sound recording copyright. Id. at 212. Consequently, the Bridgeport Music holding is
not limited by Dowling.
208 See supra Part II.B.1-3 to understand how construing a musical copyright as physical
copyright would help defeat claims enumerated therein.
209 Declan McCullagh, Could Hollywood Hack your PC?, CNETNEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/Could+Hollywood+hack+your+PC/2100-1023_3-945923.html (last
modified July 24, 2002). See also H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. § 514(a) (2002) [hereinafter The
Bill].
210 The Bill states, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any State or Federal statute or other law... a copyright
2008]
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acted due to its late introduction in the 2002 term.21' However, with
the conclusion of the November 2006 election, the Democrats have
taken control of Congress and The Bill may yet become a reality.1 2
In September 2006, then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
called for ISPs to retain a record of their customers' online activi-
ties. 2  Gonzales lobbied for support under the guise of preventing
crime against child pornography.214 The Bill was officially intro-
duced in the House of Representatives on February 6, 2007.215 How-
ever, the Bill is quite broad as it only mentions that the records would
be retained under regulations issued by the Attorney General. 216 No
vote has taken place on the Bill.
21 7
In October 2006, FBI Director Robert Mueller called on ISPs
owner shall not be liable in any criminal or civil action for disabling, in-
terfering with, blocking, diverting, or otherwise impairing the unauthor-
ized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of his or her
copyrighted work on a publicly accessible peer-to-peer file trading net-
work, if such impairment does not, without authorization, alter, delete, or
otherwise impair the integrity of any computer file or data residing on
the computer of a file trader.
H.R. 5211, supra note 209.
211 See Kristine Pesta, Comment, The Piracy Prevention Bill, H.R. 5211: The Second
Generation's Answer to Copyright Infringement over Peer-To-Peer Networks, 33 Sw. U. L.
REv. 397, 417 (2004) (citing Congressman May Back Off on Tactics in Anti Piracy Bill,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 27, 2002, at 10).
212 See Declan McCullagh, What the Democrats' Win Means for Tech, CNETNEwS.COM,
http ://news.com.comlWhat+the+Democrats+win+means+for+tech/2100-1028_3-
6133833.html (last modified Jan. 2, 2007). McCullagh wrote that if Representative Howard
Berman becomes the chairman of copyright subcommittee, the recording industry would
have an ally. Representative Berman did indeed become the chairman of the copyright sub-
committee, however, there has not been any further legislative activity regarding The Bill.
See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
http://judiciary.house.gov/committeestructure.aspx?committee=3 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
213 See McCullagh, supra note 146.
214 Id.
215 See H.R. 837, 110th Cong. § 6 (as introduced by Representative Smith, Feb. 6, 2007).
216 Id.
217 In an exhaustive search of the legislative history of the House of Representatives, it
appears that no further action has taken place on House Bill 837.
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to retain customer records to help with the war on terrorism.1 8 In
presenting the need for such legislation, Mueller stated that before
some offenders could be caught, ISPs had deleted the information
that would have helped build a case against such criminals.2 19
In May 2007, then Attorney General Gonzales proposed the
Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2007 ("IPPA").2" The IPPA
would criminalize attempted copyright infringement.22' More impor-
tantly however, the IPPA would allow more wiretaps for infringe-
ment, and attempted infringement investigations.222 The proposal,
among others, is currently being reviewed by Representative Ber-
man's office.223
The foregoing shows that a further derogation of privacy
rights is occurring, and legislation may be passed in the immediate
future. Should such legislation be enacted, the Internet would be
saturated with law enforcement and private investigation firms seek-
ing out copyright infringers and criminal offenders. If Representative
Berman's bill were eventually enacted, a record company would no
longer need to employ private investigation firms. A record company
218 Declan McCullagh, FBIDirector Wants ISPs to Track Users, CNETNEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/FBI+director+wants+ISPs+to+track+users/2100-7348_3-6126877.html
(last modified Oct. 18, 2006).
219 Id.
220 Declan McCullagh, Gonzales Proposes New Crime: 'Attempted' Copyright Infringe-
ment, CNETNEws.coM (May 15, 2007), http://news.com.com/8301-10784_3-9719339-
7.html.
221 See Letter from Richard A. Hertling, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 10 (May 14, 2007), available at
http://politechbot.com/docs/doj.intellectual.property.protection.act.2007.051407.pdf. At-
tached to the letter is the proposed Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2007. Id. at 1. See
also McCullagh, supra note 220.
222 McCullagh, supra note 220.
223 Id.
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employee could log on to any popular P2P network and disable in-
fringing users from the comfort of the record company's office.22 4
Even if Berman's bill is not enacted, Gonzales' recommendation may
be successful and a record company could go directly to an ISP for a
record of any customers' online activity.
Enacting such bills would help protect the viability of musical
copyrights and secure royalty payments to those artists whose record
labels have already recouped on their investment, while curbing the
downward spiral of the music industry.225 Of course, consumers may
prevent the situation without the enactment of debilitating statutes
gaining access to consumers' personal life by comporting: purchas-
ing physical albums or the digital counterpart off such digital stores
such as the iTunes Music Store.226
In concluding the preceding Section, a quote from Cary
Sherman, President of the RIAA seems apt.
[O]ur right to privacy does not include a right to com-
mit illegal acts anonymously. You or I may have a
right to keep our banking transactions private, but
when we stick a gun in a teller's face and ask for the
contents of the cash drawer, the bank is more than en-
titled to take our picture with a security camera. The
same is true on the Internet. Offering to upload music
files without permission so millions of strangers can
224 While the final language to such a bill is yet to be determined, the Fourth Amendment
may stand as a barrier because the federal government would be placing its "power, property
and prestige behind" a record company's actions. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
225 Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2007, at Al (reporting the music industry has been in a seven-year decline, and that in the
first three months of 2007, sales of CDs had plummeted twenty percent from the previous
year).
226 However, the digital music sales have not helped to offset the decline in music sales
across the board. See id.
[Vol. 24
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copy them off the Internet is neither a private act nor a
legal one. Should those who engage in this gratuitous
giveaway of other people's property be able to conceal
their identity behind computer numbers or made-up
screen names? 22
7
III. CONCLUSION
Copyrights vest authors with a monopoly over the created
work. This monopoly, constitutional in origin, includes the rights to
distribute and reproduce the works. When a direct infringer
downloads or uploads an author's musical work for mass consump-
tion by the P2P public, that person infringes upon the author's rights.
Holders of a copyright in a musical work must be allowed to protect
the profitability or viability of their copyrights, even if that means in-
vading the home computer of suspected direct infringers. Moreover,
the failure of certain digital copyright protection schemes demon-
strate the urgency with which courts and the federal government
should take action.228
Characterizing a home computer invasion as a violation of di-
rect infringers' privacy rights would contravene the purpose of the
Copyright Act-to give a monopoly to authors for a limited time.
Allowing privacy type claims against copyright holders would pre-
vent the expeditious remedy of unauthorized trafficking of copy-
righted works.
At Napster's peak, 260 million albums were being
227 See Pesta, supra note 211, at 414 (quoting Cary Sherman, Issue is Piracy, Not Privacy,
USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, at A 11).
228 See generally Pesta, supra note 211 (discussing the various forms of failed digital
copyright protection schemes).
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downloaded every month.229 If the average price of each physical al-
bum was ten dollars, the music industry would be deprived of 2.6 bil-
lion dollars. That income could be used to clear some artists of the
debt owed to their respective record companies, and allow the indi-
vidual artists to begin receiving royalty payments.
Because many record labels are reportedly experiencing a fi-
nancial decline,23 ° judges presiding over direct infringement of musi-
cal copyright cases should not hold copyright holders-the record la-
bels-liable for trespass to chattels, invasion of privacy, or violating
the CFAA. Courts should recognize that the rights of both individu-
als and copyright holders are constitutional in origin. Yet, persons
derive their privacy rights from the Constitution only when govern-
ment action is involved. When a direct infringer downloads music
from the Internet, they are violating the Constitutional rights of a
copyright holder. To say that one can illegally download music
through a veil of secrecy is tantamount to saying a jailed convict
should have the right to vote while in prison because his right to vote
is derived from the Constitution.
However, direct infringers do not enjoy privacy protection
when engaged in illegal downloading. Private firms, which are not
involved with government action, are investigating home computers.
Therefore, a copyright holder, deriving the right to protect its prop-
erty from the Constitution, has a paramount right to that of a direct
infringer attempting to protect his computer from an invasion.
Alternatively, should courts find the foregoing arguments un-
229 See Bainwol, supra note 3.
230 Smith, supra note 225.
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persuasive, the possibility of government action is looming. As dem-
onstrated in Part II.D., government action would break down the re-
maining walls of privacy should courts not protect the paramount
rights of copyright owners.
The search for an answer to the mass infringement of copy-
right received an even greater push in May 2007 when the record
company EMI debuted the availability of digital music without copy
restrictions on Amazon.com and the iTunes Music Store.231 Unre-
stricted digital music, free of digital rights management software
('DRM"), or DRM-free music, as it is called in the tech-world, will
allow interoperability between various MP3 music players.232 How-
ever, the motive for the shift to DRM-free music can best be ques-
tioned as whether the downward slide in music sales has led record
companies to shift their marketing strategies. Will DRM-free music
allow for a greater market share amongst all consumers owning MP3
players?
Record companies are keeping a close eye on the EMI venture
because an increase in market share could mean the revitalization of
the music industry and spur the greater availability of DRM-free mu-
sic from other major record companies. 23 3 Yet, EMI's failure could
231 Greg Sandoval, Apple, Amazon May Hold Future of DRM-free Music,
CNETNEwS.coM, http://news.com.com/Apple%2C+Amazon+may+hold+future+of+DRM-
free+music/2100-1027_3-6184509.html?tag=nefd.top. See also Candace Lombardi, iTunes
Goes DRM-free with EMI, CNETNEwS.COM, http://news.com.com/iTunes+goes+DRM-
free+with+EMI/2100-1027_3-6187457.html (last modified May 31, 2007); Caroline
McCarthy, EMI, Apple Partner on DRM-free Premium Music, CNETNEwS.COM,
http://news.com.com/EMI,+Apple+partner+on+DRM-free+premium+music/2100-1027_3-
6172398.html (last modified Apr. 3, 2007).
232 See Lombardi, supra note 231; Sandoval, supra note 231; McCarthy, supra note 231.
233 Sandoval, supra note 231.
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also mean greater copy restrictions on digital music. 234 Yet, what
does the EMI venture mean for the privacy rights of those users pur-
chasing DRM-free music and making them available on P2P sites?
The repudiation of copy-protection on digital music could
mean that DRM-free music will be policed on the Internet more than
ever before, in the absence of formal legislation. A recent techno-
logical breakthrough, Clouseau, boasts it can stop all P2P piracy
without any alleged violation of privacy rights.235 Clouseau was re-
cently used in "Operation D-Elite," a federal crackdown on P2P file
sharing.236
However, technology moves forward, and so too must legisla-
tion. It is vital to protect the rights of artists and composers guaran-
teed by the Constitution of the United States in a rapidly advancing
digital world, at the expense of the privacy rights of those infringing
copyright.
234 Id.
235 See generally Press Release, Billboard Publicity Wire, Clouseau® Cracks the Code to
Destroy P2P Piracy (Apr. 19, 2007), available at
http://billboard.prweb.com/releases/2007/4/prweb520200.htm.
236 Id.
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